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greater control of social life. But such develop-
ments need not be linear or one-directionaL With
further modernization this tendency may well be
slowed, arrested, and even reversed. Although
totalitarianism is more easily achieved in a
modern, technically developed society, the mod-
ernization process creates such destabilizing
forces that rigid control of all forms of social life
is unlikely in transitional societies. Thus to regard
African states as totalitarian is not only prema-
ture, it is misleading.
working for Ghana's economic and social develop-
ment, as well as those working against it, militat-
ed against such an outcome.
The Myth of Totalitarian Triumph
It is necessary, in summary , to return to the
question we have been concerned with in this
essay. That question is: Is, Africa in danger of
totalitarian rule? We have not dealt with whether
or not African regimes are good or bad. This is a.
crucial moral question \vhich must be constantly
weighed according to each individual's philosophi-
cal norms. We have not considered whether or
not Africa's leaders have been wise or foolish in
terms of the goals that have been set for them or
even the goals they set for themselves. This is an
all-important prudential and strategic question.
Rather we have sought to determine if any
regimes in Africa can be accurately designated:"
totalitarian. It is my belief that even the most
authoritarian of them have fundamental weak-
nesses; that even the most monolithic are rent
with divisions of purpose and organization; and
that none is or has been totalitarian. Undeniably
there have been tendencies in the direction of
NOTES
I. A Dictionary of the Social Sciences, edited by Julius G<luld
& William L. Kolb (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1964),
p. 719.
2. David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1965). -
3. New York Times (Westem edition), January 11, 1964, p. 2;
and February 8, 1964, pp. I & 4. -
4. A careful account appears in: St. Clair Drake and Leslie
Alexander Lacy, "Government Ver~s the Unions: The Se-
kondi-Tal;:oradi Strike, 1961," in Gwendolen Carter (ed.)
Politics in Africa: 7 Cases (New York: Harcourt, Brace &
World, 1966), pp. 67-118.
5. Arthur Hopcraft, "Party and People in Ghana," in Man-chester Guardian Weekly, Februray 13 1964, p. 7. .
6. "Back to the 'Dawn Broodcast'," West Afric~, No.2520 (18
September 1965), p. 1039.
7. See William Gutteridge, "Mititary Elitcs in Ghana and Ni-
geria," African Forum, II, No. I (Swnmer, 1966), pp. 31-41.
.
In
/!i1 ~~P p " .i ~N1S14
~ .-,1
IFN"'-
4
ALGERIA
tJA
LI&YA
r?~
ii '-
uNnED",1
ARA1\
~EPUSI:IC ,
,,~
~'--
~"';" !
r}
NIGER
CHAD J'R.
~~LAND
-
",,01;
!,~
'C,
'\'
'f::J
{ 5U7'-
/
KN!G£RI~/
~ Ja
: ;;J£
£nt~PIJ'-
~
~
AFRK:AN
~Pl.IBLIC-l-EONE
~
~~. I
GH4NA / I
Toyo!
DAHOMEY
~~.~
Although the quantitative
importance of the mineral re-
sources of Africa is generally
appreciated, the economic and
political consequences of those
resources have been inade-
quately treated in both t4e
scholarly and the more public
press. To whom are the miner-
al resources of Africa impor-
tant? How is the exploitation
of these minerals controlled?
Have the "African revolution"
or the 'winds of change" af-
fected the industry? What arethe prospects for the future? .
Mineral Wealth
The minerals of Africa
may, in a very real sense, be
more important to Europe, .
and other industrial areas of
the world than they are to
Africa. Africans cannot them-
selves eat the ores, nor do
they have the industrial sys-
tems that utilize minerals. For
Europe, as for other developed
industrial systems;, minerals
have become as necessary as
is food for organic systems.
The Africans, by and large,
participate only in the extrac-
tion of the ores, which are
then shipped out of the Afri-
can sphere. "The company"; a
social institution t..h"!q-~ 9 4
which vast under8~~~
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can be organized, gets paid for the mineral pro-
duct, and out of those earnings, the African miner
is paid a wage and the African state a small share
through taxes or royalties. The African miner
buys such necessities as food and clothing with
his wage; the African state with its share buys
such things as means of administration and of
\transportation largely in and out of the mining
regions. The company uses its remaining profits
to pay dividends to shareholders, regularly out-
side of Africa, and to invest in capital equipment
for further mining undertakings so that the great-
ly increased world demand for minerals to feed
industrial systems can be met.
In these ways the African mining industry
has been developed to. produce significant pdr-
tions of the ores needed for European industry ,
even while Africa in -general remains underde-
veloped, and Africans living close to richly en-
dowed mines remain in poverty. African mines
~roduce 23% of the antimony of the world, 6%
(and soon more) of the bauxite, 31% of the
chromium ore, 22% of the copper ore, 90% of the
diamonds, 67% of the gold, 28% of the manganese,
28% of the phospate rock, 11% of the tin concen-
trates, 15% of the uraniutn, 29% of the vanadium
ore, and 7% of the zinc ore of the world (U. S.
Dept. of Commerce. Overseas Business Reports,
August, 1966.) Contrast these figures with Africa's
percentage of the world's supply of other valu-
ables-people, automobiles, telephones, educa-
tion, physicians-to fully appreciate how little
Africans get from the industrial countries in re-
turn for what the African mining industry yields.
: Misled perhaps by two very special, illusory
cases, South Africa and the Congo, some students
of African development have overemphasized the
spin-off effect of mining enterprises. The fairly
spectacular growth of these two systems to which
mining is central is probably more explained by
the manner in which each government could
manipulate the labor supply (each in its own way)
so as to foster investment and reinvestment than
-it is to any intrinsic property of mining enter-
prises. In the Congo, where under the Belgians
the economy was growing by 25ro per year, the
cost Qf labor was deliberately kept low, and prof-
its of the companies high, by forcing the popula-
-tion to Rroduce foods and fibers, necessities for
maintaining the population. In South Africa the
cost of labor is kept low by direct and indirect
f!,overnment control of the labor supply for min-
ing. Whereas in many countries gold production
has-vix:~ually ceased because the price remains
stable while costs rise, in South Africa, where a
miner is paid something less than the minimum
judged necessary to keep a family in health, 1966
gold production is 181% of the rate in 1957.
Reaching this rate, however, requires more than
mere cheap labor; it also requires investment of
capital, for despite the depr.essed wage costs other
, -f!,old-mining costs have risen, at more than 3%
per annum (in fact, 1966 costs are 6% over those
of 1965). From an African point of view, such
heavy' investments of- capital might better be
made in another industry, one with greater rel-
evan~e to economic production for Africans. In
South Africa currently such reinvestment and
growth in mining for other minerals is also oc-
curring. The 1966 rate of production of iron is
400% that of 1957, the copper rate-354% of 1957 ,
manganese-,-248%, diamonds-254ro. ("Financial
Times and Industrial Press," Feb. 1967.) These in-
creases, too, require enormous investment of capi-
tal and have very slight bearing on the general
economic or social development of the country .
(An informative analysis demonstrating the lack
of congruence between mining development and
f!,eneral social and economic development, draw-
ing data largely from Latin America, is a study
by Glaucio Soares, Economic Development and
Political Radicalism, Doctoral Dissertation, Wash-
ington University, St. Louis, 1965.)
The Excavation Economy
For the long term, it should be recalled that
extractive industries leave an emptiness where
they have extracted. Gaping holes, piles of tail-
ings of little or absolutely no use-,-these are anti-
cipated prospects. Some of the damage they do
may lie hidden, unexplored. In their intensity to
exploit the lands of Africa and remoye her ores
to Europe, some delicate natural ecological bal-
ances may well be disturbed. The Bancroft cop-
per mine in Zambia can be worked only by con-
tinually pumping out water-not a little water,
but 65 million gallons a day! Can the water table
be thus lowered, without affecting other natural
things in that environment? Are the planners of
Zambian development weighing all factors in
such exploitation which has very small direct
feedback into the non-mining economy? The first
beneficiaries of Zambia's Copp~rbelt are most
certa~nly those that control th~ industry: Anglo-
American Corporation of South Africa and Amer-
ican Metal Climax.
If the mining industry is to contribute to the de-
velopment of other sectors of an economy or other
aspects of a society, profits must be taken out of
mining and -put in somewhere else. Neither the
taking out nor the putting in are likely to occur
by chance. Such actions must be taken deliber-
ately. Through deliberate generosity, some fami-
lies or fotmdations (Oppenheimer, Guggenheim,
Phelps-Stokes, African-American Institute) may
voluntarily distribute some of the profits from
mining. They may put something into education,
into an agricultUl'al demonstration project, or into
the training of social workers, but they will not
take money out of mining and invest it adequately
in the basic development of the whole local econ-
omy. Even with monopoly control, as exhibited
in the diamond industry, the controllers put ex-
cess profits into developinf!, their own enterprise~,
such as the manufacture of synthetic diamonds (in
Europe), rather than into an industry that might
also benefit Africans and lead to general African
"economic development. Thus far, in Africa, other
sectors of economics have been milked for the
benefit of the mining industry more than the min-
ing industry has been used to generate solid
growth. (For an illustration of this;--see the
author's "Capital and the Congo'~, in Southern
Africa in Transition, edited by James Baker and
John Davis. New York, 1966.) .
Governments are able to skim off some of
the cream from royalties and export taxes. How-
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ever, in the mining industry it is unusual for this
to be as high as fifty percent. In the richer min-
eral and oil industries a small percentage of prof-
its is reclaimed by reinvestment in the country .
The drain of profits abroad and the wealth of
capital gains are all lost to internal development.
Nor are these favorable terms for foreign capital
always necessary for investment and growth.
The wealth of the Congo was developed primarily
by internal capital reinvestment. Between 1950-57
external borrowing accounted for less than 10.
percent of capital accumulation.
The flow of dividends, other benefits, and
salaries abroad from mineral exploitation fre-
quently exceeds the capital imports of these de-
veloping African countries.
In this perspective, it is proper to say that
Africa and other underdeveloped areas are being
exploited more now, perhaps, than in the past,
for we are told constantly of the widening gap
between the rich nations and the poor.
Sources of the Widening Gap
The reasons for this state of affairs-the ex-
ploitation of rich African resources and yet the
,videning of the gap-are not to be sought merely
in the depredations of colonialism-"paleocoloni-
alism", if you will-nor simply in the connivance
of "neo-imperialist" financiers and industrialists
bent on enslaving the world on the South African
model. Some of the causes lie in certain historical-
ly derived peculiarities of the world economy: the
relative prices of raw materials versus manufac-
tured goods, the status in the market of what the
poor nations need relative to what the poor na-
tions control, the fact that some items in the situa-
tion ar~ indeed subject to world market condi-
tions while others are not. Africa will not achieve
economic independence until she can truly bar~
Rain, not beg, in the world marketplace. This
means that unless changes are effected in the
world economy, the African nations will not suc-
ceed in overcoming the poverty that is now their
lot. The necessary changes can come only from
international political action, not from any step,
even nationalization, taken by one country .
In regard to the mining industry, an African
country has two, or at best three, components to
control in the situation-access to the sub-soil re-
sources, to the supply of local unskilled or semi-
skilled laborers, and, sometimes, to natural power
resources-none of which are highly marketable
in the world at large. On the other hand, the com-
ponents that must be added-engineers and en~
trepreneurs, machinery and equipment-are out-
side the control of the local government and are
highly marketable on a world-wide basis. And the
mineral or metal product is clearly on the world
market. Local producer countries with no control
over the world price can only adapt to conditions
by controlling the access to the ore or by con-
trolling the unskilled local labor supply. In other
words, when the cost of engineering and entre-
preneurial talents and of capital equipment in-
crease while the price of the marketable mineral
remains steady, pressure is great to reduce wages
or numbers of unskilled workers or to reduce the
royalties or taxes on the extracted minerals just
to keep the plant in operation. Whether the
governInent or sorne for~ign cornpany o~s the
plant is not the crucial criterion; the fact that
access to the ore and unskilled labor are alone
not subject to direct world rnarket conditions is
the governing factor.
Gold
The Governrnent of Ghana can no rnore af-
ford to operate a gold rnine at a loss than can
Consolidated Gold Fields of South Africa. But
the South African Governrnent keeps the mines
open, even though the world price of gold is rela-
tively low, by keeping mine wages low; in Ghana.
by contrast, several rnines closed.
What is the rneaning of a "price" in the world .
rnarket? The United States works diligently on
the world market to keep the price of gold as low
as it is; but, on the other hand, it is the interna-
tional political decision to use gold to balance in-
ternational payrnents that keeps the price of gold
as high as it is. It is well to remember that "world
market price" is nota natural price. Prices in any
situation emerge frorn human interaction. Most
world prices are manipulated in one way or
another, but only by those with power, and power
is increased by units working in conjunction with
one another. The African states have been unable
thus far to cooperate enough to have much effect.
The mining companies have done better at this.
The gold-producing companies of South Africa
are so well-organized, for both internal coopera-
tion and external solidarity that they alone pro-
duce almost three-quarters of all the gold pro-
duced in the world. Through C. W. Engelhard, an
American citizen who serves on South Africa's
quasi-official Charnber of Mines but is a New
J ersey supporter of the Great Society, the gold
mining companies of South Mrica influence the
United States Government. They rnanaged a con~
tract under which the United States Atornic
Energy Commission guaranteed loans for $100
million by the American Export-Import BaJ+k so
that the Gold Mining Companies might tool up to
produce uranium, which the United States and
the United Kingdom bought, during the ten years
from 1957-1967 at a rate some four times higher
than American producers were being paid. Price
is what can be managed. -The Piamond Industry .
The diamond industry is even better organized
and again tends to focus on South Africa. Cartel
arrangements have been effective in maintaining
very high diarnond prices. The price of gems is
raised as much as ten per cent at one time by the
Central Selling Organization; still, the ca'rtel has
managed to control most producers ahd thus to
control the market to their own benefit.
[For rnany details on the organii.:ation of min-
ing companies in Africa, the reader is referred to
the author's "The Mrican Mineral Industry: Evo-
lution of a Supranational Level of Integration,"
Social Problems. (Fall, 1963).]
The Copper Industry
Consider copper, an important metal widely
used and widely found over the earth but grow-
inf1. scarcer as demand increases. Copper-produc-
ing companies allover the world, but particular-
ly those in Mrica, maintain fairly close connec-
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tions with one another so that the production and
marketing of copper can be organized in their
own long-term interest. The goal is to minimize
fluctuations in price and in production so that the
whole copper industry is efficient and profitable.
Price control as such is precluded because of the
large numbers of producers but also because of
the competition from other metals, ~uch as alumi-
num, which would make it' unwise to drive cop-
per prices up very high. In fact, in 1966, with
strikes and the shortage of coal in Zambia inter-
fering with production in the face of greatly in-
creased demands, copper producers tried hard to
supply users without raising prices for fear that
if they were not supplied they would turn to
aluminum to the long term detriment of the cop-
per industry. In 1967, concern was shown over the
dispute between the Congo Government and
Union Miniere or Societe Generale de Belgique,
for all copper producers lose, potentially, when
interruptions in delivery , such as might have
been caused by Congo's prohibiting exports, make
industrial manufacturers consider moving from
copper to aluminum.
The companies are organized, at least loosely,
in a network of overlapping groups so that even
though a company may compete directly with
another at one level, their higher-level suprana-
tional organization emphasizes their common in-
terests.
An African Consortium
The African states, weak as they are individu-
ally, have not methodically uti~ized what resour-
ces they have for enhanc;:ing their collective in-
fluence vis-a-vis the developed industrial systems.
Individual attempts at nationalization have no ef-
fect on the rate of exchange between what the
developing country has to give and what the de-
veloping country needs. Collective action, aiming
at control of a significant proportion of the re-
source-say copper and its substitutes such as
aluminuni-could force the industrial systems to
pay more for what they use. Such action, if suc-
cessful, could begin to close the gap. If the United
States can manipulate the price of gold, if a com-
pany cartel can manipulate the price of diamonds,
why should not an OAU or ECA or OCAM unit-
ing Congo (Kinshasa), Zambia, Ghana, Congo(Brazzaville), Mauretania, Guinea, South West
Africa, Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Cameroun mani-
pulate the price of copper and aluminum (and
their substitutes). Collectively, they could get a
higher price on the world market for Vfhat theyhave to sell. -
In the ten years during which so many Afri-
can states achieved independence, 1957 to 1967 ,
these new states have tended to bargain individu-
ally, not collectively, in their dealings with com-
panies in the mining industry .It might not be
valid to say that the Africans lost each encounter,
but it is fair to say that, had they united as Afri-
cans controlling their resources, they might have
struck better bargains. Both Zambia and Congo
have copper resources of immense importance,
and each African country has been dealing quite
independently with various companies, thus not
bargaining from the strongest possible position.
Zambia purchased back from the British South
Africa Company mining rights for the future on
land where the Company had profited enormous-
ly for forty years. Perhaps the price was not dear,
but some legal experts believed the Company's
rights would not have been valid if tested against
international law. Should Zambia with all its.
needs have paid the British South Africa Com-
pany anything more, beyond all the royalties col-
lected?
The Congo Government's recent attempt to
reassert greater control over the mining industry
established in Congo might have been more suc-
cessful if it had had support from other African
states. As it happened, the companies apparently
held their ground, established at the supranational
level, all of them refusing to deal with the com-
pany established by the Congo government so
lon.f{ as the Societe Generale de Belgique and
Union Miniere (of Belgium) remained unsatisfied.
A consortium composed of the Belgian Banque
Lambert, the French Penarroya Company, and the
American Newmont Mining Company, presum-
ably organized to acquire 40% interest in the
.E{overnment-controlled company which was to re-
place Union Miniere, reportedly refused to buy
any shares at all unless the Congo government
indemnified Union Miniere. Without staunch al-
lies among its fellow African states, the Congo
.E{overnment was forced to accept an agreement
that returns essentially to the status quo ante.
Instead of Union Miniere, there will be the Gen-
erale Congolaise des- Minerais administered by\ Societe Generale des Minerais.
Foreign Advisors and African Interests
In its negotiations with Union Miniere and
its allies, the Congo had the counsel of Theodore
Sorensen, formerly assistant to the late President
Kennedy. Zambia has also used expatriate coun-
sellors in its relations ~ith the mining industry .
Probably most African states have done so.
The use of foreign expert advisers is inher-
ently weak. Their counsel is likely to be limited
to the purely technical (in either law, or econom-
ics, or engineering) and conceived in the con-
text of status quo; the basic problems, however,
are surely political, and the context of African
decision-making should be oriented toward a fu-
ture world system quite different from today's.
The inappropriateness of the advice of politi-
cally sterile technicians is clear in reports by
teams of experts from the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development and from the
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa-
.For ex~mple, severaf.yea .The.World ~a~1s,.;.
TanzanIa, and ZambIa advIsed agaInst bUlldIng
e anzam raI In on the technical grounds that
it was not economical, apparently utterly oblivious
.to the crucial role such a railway to the Indian
Ocean would play in the fight against racism and
colonialism in Southern Africa.
Such a rail link would have strengthened
them, too, vis-a-vis the private investors such as
Tanganyika Concessions, Ltd., who have interests
not only in important mines, such as Union
Miniere's in Congo, but also in the important
Benguela Railway through Portuguese Angola.
Had the African states acted with unity-and
19

